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Apprendi and Federalism
“In my view this Court should continue to forbear
from fettering the States with an adamant rule which
may embarrass them in coping with their own peculiar
problems in criminal law enforcement.’’1
“‘[T]he States under our federal system have the
principal responsibility for defining and prosecuting
crimes.’ The Court endangers this allocation of respon-
sibility for the prevention of crime when it applies to
the States doctrines developed in the context of federal
law enforcement, without any attention to the special
problems which the States as a group or particular
States may face.’’2
A curious alliances of five justices, first forged five
years ago in the fires of Jones v. United States,3 has
adopted an increasingly aggressive (some might say reck-
less) jurisprudence interpreting the Sixth Amendment.
That jurisprudence, the Apprendi doctrine, requires the
jury to find any fact (apart from prior conviction) that
increases either the statutory maximum sentence or the
highest end of a sentencing range under a system of
determinate sentencing.4 This doctrine, rooted in these
five justices’ shared belief that certain forms of sentence
enhancements invade the jury’s traditional province, cul-
minated in the Court’s very recent decision in Blakely
v. Washington.5 In Blakely, the Court invalidated a sec-
tion of Washington’s sentencing guidelines. It seems
likely in the forthcoming decisions in United States v.
Booker and United States v. Fanfan to extend its reason-
ing to the upward-adjustment provisions of the federal
guidelines.
Since the emergence of the Apprendi majority and
its newly minted (and evolving) constitutional limits on
criminal punishment, many commentators have begun
to address its implications for the horizontal relations
between the branches of government — between legisla-
tors and courts, between judges and juries, and between
judges and prosecutors.6 Less widely addressed, though
equally (if not more) important, has been the Apprendi
doctrine’s implications for vertical relations, particularly
federalism.7
This essay seeks to begin to fill that lacuna in the
literature.8 Part I explains how Apprendi undermines
principles of federalism, a curious tension because several
of Apprendi’s strongest defenders, particularly Justices
Scalia and Thomas, are also the most ardent protectors
of federalism. Part II proposes how these justices can
reconcile their commitments to Apprendi and federal-
ism: relying on the Privileges or Immunities Clause,
they should hold that the Sixth Amendment aspects of
Apprendi do not apply to the states except where a state
scheme departs from settled historical practice. Part III
tests this theory against the existing Supreme Court
Apprendi jurisprudence and as a tool for solving sev-
eral current Apprendi-related debates developing in state
courts. Part IV concludes.
I. The Federalism Challenge for Apprendi’s Defenders
Imagine that Congress enacts a federal law that imposes
the following mandates on the states:
(1) In a state criminal trial, a jury, not a judge, must
find any fact (other than the fact of prior
conviction) that increases the statutory
maximum penalty for the crime;
(2) In a state capital sentencing proceeding, only the
jury, not a judge, may make the factual findings
of aggravating circumstances necessary to render
the defendant eligible for the death penalty;
(3) In a state statutory sentencing guideline scheme,
a jury, not a judge, must find any fact (other than
prior conviction) that increases the sentencing
range beyond that specified in the guidelines.
Such a statute would undoubtedly evoke howls of
protest from federalism apologists. They likely would
challenge the law as an unconstitutional intrusion on
state sovereignty, and, given the current penchant for
federalism in the Supreme Court, they might well succeed.
In other contexts, a reliable bloc of five justices has
repeatedly invalidated federal intrusions on the states and
has reasserted the primacy of states in the administration
of criminal justice.9
Of course, Congress does not need to enact such a
statute, for the Apprendi majority has accomplished pre-
cisely the same result through a few strokes of a far less
democratic pen. The Apprendi doctrine represents an ex-
ceptional burden imposed on the states by the federal
government, here through a binding constitutional
decision of the federal judiciary.10 It reallocates a share
of the punishment power from state judges to state ju-
ries who now must find nearly all facts that enhance a
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defendant’s potential punishment. It restricts state leg-
islatures in their ability to design punishment schemes,
perhaps encouraging them to adopt severe punishments
for crimes with fewer elements where additional facts
trigger mandatory minima. It calls into doubt the con-
stitutionality of nearly twenty states’ sentencing schemes
and frustrates other states’ efforts at developing their
own schemes.11 It could strain the budgets of state courts
that may have to resolve more cases through trials or
cumbersome sentencing hearings.12 Finally, the doctrine
could ultimately allocate greater power to state prosecu-
tors who effectively circumvent many of the Court’s newly
announced restrictions through creative plea bargain-
ing and the design of guilty pleas which waive the jury
right.13
The doctrinal explanation for the impact of the Ap-
prendi doctrine on the states may be straightforward —
after Duncan v. Louisiana, the states must accept the
Court’s gloss on the Sixth Amendment (what’s good for
the federal goose is good for the fifty-state gander).14 Yet
two members of the Apprendi majority (Justices Scalia
and Thomas) also have been among the most loyal mem-
bers of the “Federalism Five’’ committed to protecting the
states from federal intrusions and preserving their pri-
macy in the administration of criminal justice. At times,
both justices have split with the Apprendi majority —
Justice Scalia in Harris and Justice Thomas in the pre-
Apprendi cases of Monge and Almendarez-Torres (a vote
he later expressed a willingness to reconsider).15 Can they
simultaneously maintain their commitments to Apprendi
and federalism?
Traditional doctrines do not adequately vindicate the
federalism principles here. Doctrines such as retroactivity
(which seems likely to apply after Schriro v. Summerlin)
and procedural default might diminish the doctrine’s
impact for final convictions.16 But they do not minimize
the impact for state convictions that are not yet final.
While some of these non-final convictions might still be
upheld under the harmless and plain error rules of Neder
and Cotton, even these doctrines do not fully recoup the
costs to the states of the Apprendi rule.17 Apprendi and
Blakely still will burden state courts with new filings, force
prosecutors to rethink their charging practices in future
cases and compel states to reconsider their sentencing
schemes.18
If these competing values cannot be reconciled, then
arguments about the meaning of the Apprendi doctrine
likely will unfold along horizontal lines — about its impact
on the relationship between prosecutors, legislatures,
judges and juries. However, if these competing values can
be reconciled, the solution may well counsel how Justices
Scalia and Thomas, if fully committed to federalism
principles, should consider voting in future cases and,
consequently, how such cases will be resolved. The next
section sketches out a possible solution to their federalist
dilemma.
II. The Privileges or Immunities Clause as a Solution to
the Federalism Dilemma
In my view, Apprendi and federalism can only be recon-
ciled if the Court is willing to decouple its Sixth Amend-
ment jurisprudence from its incorporation jurisprudence.
In other words, the Court should develop two strands of ju-
risprudence on the jury right — a broad Sixth Amendment
jurisprudence applicable only to the federal government
and a narrower Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence
applicable to the states. Such an approach finds its roots
in the Court’s old incorporation debates.19 It also finds
support in both the text of the Constitution and the history
of the jury right — sources that likely would appeal to
Justices Scalia and Thomas. While the Court’s incorpora-
tion jurisprudence may make it difficult to develop this
doctrine in the Due Process Clause, the recent revival of
the Privileges or Immunities Clause provides the Court a
fresh opportunity to revisit the scope of the incorporation
doctrine in light of Apprendi.
A. Incorporation and the Sixth Amendment
To identify a solution, we must return to the case where
the fissure between the jury right and federalism first de-
veloped — Duncan v. Louisiana.20 The details of that case
are well known. At its narrowest level, Duncan presented
the question whether the Sixth Amendment applied to a
state where the state’s constitution only required a jury for
offenses punishable by death or hard labor. More broadly,
however, Duncan represented one battle in a longer fight
between warring camps over the proper understanding
of the incorporation doctrine. An alliance of total incor-
porationists and selective incorporationists carried the
day and held that the Sixth Amendment did apply to the
case before the Court. As a consequence, for the past
thirty-five years, states have been obligated to respect not
only the text of the Sixth Amendment itself but whatever
guarantees might attach as a result of the judicial gloss on
that amendment.
Not all justices in Duncan embraced that approach. In
separate opinions, both Justice Fortas and Justice Harlan
(joined by Justice Stewart) applied a “fundamental fair-
ness’’ methodology to the issue before the Court. While
reaching opposite conclusions, both recognized an essen-
tial insight of central importance to the Apprendi debate:
even assuming that the Due Process Clause incorporates
some protections reflected in the Court’s interpretation of
the Bill of Rights, there is no principled reason to assume
that it incorporates all of those protections. Justice Fortas
expressed this view forcefully:
Neither logic nor history nor the intent of the draftsmen
of the Fourteenth Amendment can possibly be said to
require that the Sixth Amendment or its jury trial provi-
sion be applied to the States together with the total gloss
that this Court’s decisions have supplied. . . . There is no
reason whatever for us to conclude that . . . we are bound
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slavishly to follow not only the Sixth Amendment but all
of its bag and baggage, however, securely or insecurely
affixed they may be by law and precedent to federal
proceedings.21
Echoing similar sentiments, Justice Harlan in dissent
chided his brethren in the majority for blindly assuming
that “the Jury Trial Clause of the Sixth Amendment
should be incorporated into the Fourteenth, jot-for-jot and
case-for-case’’ and explained that “[t]here is no reason to
assume that the whole body of rules developed in this
Court constituting Sixth Amendment jury trial must be
regarded as a unit.’’22 Wholesale incorporation of both the
Sixth Amendment and its accompanying jurisprudence,
Justice Harlan wrote, “put the States in a constitutional
straitjacket with respect to their own development in the
administration of criminal or civil law.’’23
Justice Fortas and Harlan instruct that the key to
reconciling the values underpinning the right to a jury
trial with federalism principles is to decouple the Sixth
Amendment from the unreflective incorporation of it.24
Such an approach respects the States’ “primary respon-
sibility for operating the machinery of criminal justice
within their borders, and adapting it to their particular
circumstances.’’25 Additionally, Justice Fortas explained, it
“allow[s] the greatest latitude for state differences’’ and the
“maximum opportunity for diversity and minimal imposi-
tion of uniformity of method and detail upon the States.’’26
B. A New Approach to Incorporation
Justice Harlan of course lost his fight to limit incorpo-
ration of an amendment’s jurisprudence (warts and all)
through the Due Process Clause. Yet more recent ju-
risprudential developments, endorsed by both Justices
Scalia and Thomas, create fresh opportunities for them
to revisit the pro-federalist principles underpinning
Justice Harlan’s position. They could build on the Court’s
emerging jurisprudence under the Privileges or Immu-
nities Clause to reconcile the Apprendi principle with
federalism principles.
Following the Slaughterhouse Cases, the Privileges
or Immunities Clause largely remained a dead letter for
more than a century.27 Six terms ago in Saenz v. Roe,
however, a majority of the Supreme Court breathed new
life into the clause.28 In Saenz, the Court invalidated
a California law limiting the welfare benefits of new
arrivals to the State. Sanez is important, though, not for
this particular holding but because it demonstrates more
generally the Court’s willingness to revive the Privileges
or Immunities Clause. Both Justice Scalia and Justice
Thomas signed onto this project. Justice Scalia joined the
majority which relied on the clause to invalidate the statute
challenged in Saenz. Justice Thomas, while dissenting,
agreed with the principle that the Slaughterhouse Cases
read the Privileges or Immunities Clause far too narrowly
and expressed a willingness to reconsider the decision.
Thus, both Justices have gone on record as supporting the
Privileges or Immunities Clause as a potential restraint
on the conduct of states.
Though the Court has not yet extended the logic of
Sanez to the criminal context, its resuscitation of the Priv-
ileges or Immunities Clause presents Justices Scalia and
Thomas with an opportunity to develop a jurisprudence
on the jury right more sensitive to state concerns. Some
of the scant research surrounding the drafting of the
Civil War Amendments has suggested that the drafters
intended for those amendments, not the Due Process
Clause, to serve as the primary vehicle for incorporating
some fundamental rights against the states.29 Follow-
ing the course suggested by this historical research, the
justices could use the clause to develop an alternative
incorporation jurisprudence along the lines suggested by
Justice Harlan — one that does not incorporate the entire
corpus of Sixth Amendment jurisprudence against the
states but instead only those that along some criterion
warrant incorporation.30
Such an approach should appeal to both Justice Scalia
and Thomas. Begin with the text of the Constitution.
Though often overlooked, the right to a criminal jury trial
actually appears in two places in the Constitution. Most
jurists recall that it appears in the Sixth Amendment.
Additionally, it also appears in Article III of the Consti-
tution, a fact too often overlooked in the Blakely debate.
Specifically, Article III, Section 2 Clause 3 requires that
the trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment,
shall be by jury. As a textual matter, then, the codification
of the jury right in Article III suggests that the Framers of
the Constitution thought that the right was primarily one
affecting the federal courts.
History supports this approach too. Again often over-
looked is the fact that the Framers considered and rejected
a provision of the Constitution that would have pro-
hibited the states from depriving a criminal defendant
of the right to a jury trial.31 Their rejection of this pro-
posal lends further support to the notion that the jury
right in the federal constitution was never meant to con-
strain the administration of state systems of criminal
justice.
Justice Thomas may be particularly receptive to such
an approach. In his separate opinion in the Newdow case,
Justice Thomas suggested a willingness to reconsider
the Court’s incorporation jurisprudence concerning the
Establishment Clause.32 In his view, the Court’s incor-
poration jurisprudence had overlooked the fact that the
Establishment Clause may have been designed precisely
to preserve for the states the power to enact laws governing
the establishment of a religion. While Newdow concerned
the Establishment Clause, the methodology of Justice
Thomas’s opinion is crucial. It suggests a broader willing-
ness to revisit the incorporation jurisprudence when that
jurisprudence departs from the original understanding of
a particular provision of the Bill of Rights.
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If the Court revisits its incorporation jurisprudence
through the lens of the Privileges or Immunities Clause,
what should be the proper criterion for deciding what
aspects of the judicial gloss on the Sixth Amendment
apply to the states? While Justices Fortas and Harlan
anchored their jurisprudence in “fundamental fairness,’’
the viability of their methodology does not depend on
this particular criterion. Rather, as a logical matter at
least, any neutral criterion — text, structure, history,
or state practice — potentially can supply a principled
means for delineating the boundaries between those
aspects of the Sixth Amendment that apply across all
levels of government and those aspects that apply to the
federal government alone. If one accepts the premise
that Justices Scalia and Thomas are likely to supply the
critical votes on cases implicating the intersection of
Apprendi and federalism, then appeals to “fundamental
fairness’’ are likely to be unavailing. Instead, history
supplies a more likely criterion by which these justices
could differentiate between those aspects of the Sixth
Amendment jurisprudence that should be incorporated
and those that should not. Both justices previously have
relied on history to guide their interpretations of the
Due Process Clause.33 In Saenz, Justice Thomas relied
on history to inform the meaning of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause.34
To say, however, that history should guide the in-
corporation inquiry does not end the debate but merely
begins it. Like most historical inquiries, one still must
define the body of history and the historical era relevant
to the inquiry. Is it the history at the time of the Sixth
Amendment’s ratification? At the time of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s ratification? An amalgam of the two? Or is
it some other data set altogether? Following the logic of the
incorporation theory, the most sensible criterion would
be the historical practice at the time of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s ratification. At least according to the Court,
that legal act provided the mechanism by which most
provisions of the Bill of Rights came to apply to the states.
III. Applying the Privileges or Immunities Clause
How compatible would this approach be with existing
Supreme Court doctrine? Easiest to explain would be
Ring, Almendarez-Torres and Monge. The jury’s power to
find facts necessary for imposition of capital punishment
enjoys a long historical pedigree, and Ring involved a
handful of states that deviated from that well established
historical practice.35 Likewise, recidivisim enjoys a long
pedigree as a consideration factoring into the judge’s
sentencing decision rather than the jury’s guilt determi-
nation, so the Apprendi principle should not be imposed
on the states in those contexts.36
The historical approach is tougher to reconcile with
both Apprendi and Blakely. As the opinions of Justices
Thomas and O’Connor demonstrate, the historical pedi-
gree for the rule in Apprendi is debatable.37 The historical
argument for Apprendi works only if one draws on a wide
array of sources from a variety of different historical eras,
an approach that departs from the logic of a theory that
anchors incorporation in ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Blakely too is dubious under the historical
approach described above.38 Long before Blakely, judges
enjoyed enormous discretion in deciding how to sentence
defendants within the range set by the offense.39 It is
therefore unsurprising that the Blakely majority did not
preoccupy itself with the historical practice of how judges
meted out sentences within a prescribed maximum. In-
stead, it based the holding largely on precedent and treated
the case as a mere extension of the Apprendi principle in
situations where statutorily designed guidelines direct the
sentencer’s discretion.
Apart from its moderate coherence with existing
Supreme Court doctrine, the historical principle also
supplies a means for resolving several “waterfront’’ de-
bates arising in the lower courts as a result of Apprendi.
Consider one such debate in the California courts —
whether Apprendi requires a jury to decide whether a
felony is “abnormally dangerous’’ under this limitation
to California’s felony-murder rule. In People v. Schae-
fer, a California Court of Appeals recently concluded
that Apprendi did not require the jury to make that
determination.40 Under the methodology proposed here,
that was probably the right result but for reasons other
than those given by the Court. The Schaefer Court spoke
in terms of its “long-standing rule that it is a question of
law whether a crime is an inherently dangerous felony for
purposes of the felony-murder rule.’’41 Yet Schaefer cited
only a recent decision as evidence of this “long-standing
rule,” and the early case law on California’s felony-murder
rule is sparse. Nonetheless, it appears that drafters of
California’s first felony-murder rule included the tradi-
tional limitation from English law that the felony “involve
substantial human risk,’’ an issue that English Courts
treated as a question of law.42 In light of those traditional
limitations, it was appropriate for the courts to retain
the power to make the “inherently dangerous felony’’
determination.
Consider another question left over after Ring —
whether in a capital sentencing proceeding, Apprendi
requires the jury to determine that the aggravating factors
outweigh the mitigating factors. State courts have split
over this issue.43 The majority view is that Ring does not
require the jury to conduct the weighing because weight
is not a fact, unlike, for example, an aggravating factor.44
Under the historical approach proposed here, the majority
view is likely incorrect. At the time of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s ratification, the jury largely performed the
capital sentencing function.45 In states employing manda-
tory capital sentencing at that time, the jury performed
this role during its guilt determination. In states employ-
ing discretionary capital systems at that time, the jury
performed this role in its sentencing determination. In
both systems, weighing, whether it occurred explicitly or
implicitly (if indeed it occurred at all), took place during
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the jury’s deliberations. Reallocating that power to judges
strips the jury of that traditional role and, thus, offends
the historical principle offered here.
These two examples illustrate an obvious difficulty of
this methodology (or, for that matter, any methodology
anchored in history). On the one hand, to the extent the
methodology is tied to a particular time period, such as the
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, the historical
evidence during the relevant time period may be scant
at best or simply non-existent. On the other hand, to
the extent that the methodology is untethered from a
particular time period, one runs a relatively greater risk
that the historical record may support multiple, perhaps
conflicting, conclusions. The historical debate between
Justices O’Connor and Thomas in Apprendi illustrates
this unavoidable pitfall.46
Yet historical debates are nothing new to the Court.
All of the justices, but especially Justices Scalia and
Thomas, regularly engage in such historical debates, for
example, in determining the constitutionality of police
conduct under the Fourth Amendment or the proper
interpretation of a federal statute enacted against various
common law norms.47 It would be a mistake to discard a
methodology that not only holds open a hope of reconciling
two competing (and important) constitutional values but
also does so in a manner that appeals to the likely swing
votes on this issue.
IV. Conclusion
The Apprendi principle poses a challenge to justices, such
as Justices Scalia and Thomas, who are committed to
federalism principles. One might legitimately argue, as
they do, that reforms such as sentencing guidelines and
sentencing factors strip the jury of some of its traditional
powers. Yet Duncan forces those justices to consider
the impact their expansive interpretation of the Sixth
Amendment on the states. To date, their opinions in
cases such as Apprendi and Blakely do not seem to have
been sufficiently sensitive to the impact of these decisions
on principles of federalism. The approach offered here
presents them with an opportunity to refocus on issues
of federalism and to attempt to harmonize federalism
with their commitment to the jury right. While Apprendi
and federalism might seem irreconcilable at first, the
incorporation debates sparked by Justice Harlan and
others chart a path for the swing votes in Apprendi
cases to harmonize their strong desire to protect the
jury with their equally strong desire not to burden the
states excessively. The reemergence of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause in Saenz provides Justices Scalia and
Thomas, likely the swing votes in Apprendi cases, with the
opportunity to reconcile their strong commitment to the
Apprendi principle with their equally strong commitment
to federalism. It provides a vehicle by which these justices
might begin to untether their aggressive reading of the
Sixth Amendment from its anti-federalist implications—
an approach more faithful to both the constitutional
text and the constitutional history behind the jury right.
Many standards might supply the governing criteria for
“selectively incorporating’’ the Court’s Sixth Amendment
jurisprudence. In my view, history provides the guide most
faithful to the logic of the incorporation doctrine and most
consistent with jurisprudence of these two justices. Such
an approach does a moderately good job at explaining the
existing doctrine and provides a principle for addressing
“waterfront’’ issues in the Apprendi terrain.
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